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Abstract
We dene a new value for games with levels structure. We intro-
duce a new property in this class of games, balanced per capita con-
tributions, which is related with others in the literature. We provide
an axiomatic characterization of this value using this new property.
Keywords: levels structure, value, balanced per capita contribu-
tions.
1 Introduction
In many real situations the agents cooperate in order to get a benet. This
situation can be modelled as a transferable utility (TU, for short) game in
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which the players partition themselves into groups for the purpose of bar-
gaining. These situations are modelled as TU games with coalition structure.
However, in many situations a coalition structure does not provide a
complete description of the cooperation structure.
For instance, consider the members of the European Union Parliament.
In this situation, even though all of them have the same rights, they do not
act independently. The natural cooperation structure will be form by the
parties. However, on a higher level, parties may associate according to their
ideology in larger groups, such like the European Peoples Party (EPP), the
European Democrats (ED), the Party of European Socialist (PES), etc. In
an even higher level, the EPP and the ED form a larger group, the EPP-ED,
and so other groups. This example appears in Winter (1989), Calvo et al.
(1996) and Vidal-Puga (2005).
In these cases, a more detailed mapping of the cooperation structure is
needed.
This cooperation description of the players is called a levels structure.
There are several values in the literature that take into account the levels
structure. For the particular case of one single level, Aumann and Drèze
(1974) rst proposed a value for this class of games. Owen (1977) dened a
new value, the Owen value. Both values extend the Shapley value (Shapley,
(1953b)). Other extensions are provided by Hamiache (2006) and Kamijo
(2007). On the other hand, Levy and McLean (1989) proposed a value that
is an extension of the weighted Shapley value (Kalai and Samet (1984)).
Winter (1989) dened a value, the levels structure value, rst suggested
by Owen in 1977. This value is an extension of the Owen value for several
levels.
Calvo et al. (1996) provided a characterization of the levels structure value
using the principle of balanced contributions. This property states that, for
any two coalitions that belong to the same coalition at higher levels, the
amount that the players in each coalition would gain or lose by the others
coalition withdrawal from the game should be equal.
Nevertheless, when the coalitions represent groups of di¤erent size, this
symmetry among coalitions may not be always a reasonable requirement for
a value. See, for instance, Levy and McLean (1989) or Kalai and Samet
(1987).
Vidal-Puga (2006) dened a value,  for games with a unique level of
cooperation taking into account the asymmetry between the coalitions due
to their di¤erent size.
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In this paper we extend the value  for games with levels structure. More-
over we introduce a new property for this kind of games, balanced per capita
contributions, that is related to another property proposed byMyerson (1980)
and also studied by Hart and Mas-Colell (1989), Sánchez (1997) and Calvo
and Santos (2000).
The property of balanced per capita contributions states that for any two
coalitions that belong to the same coalition at higher levels, the average
amount that the players in each coalition would gain or lose by the others
coalition withdrawal from the game should be equal. The average is taken
over the number of single agents in each coalition.
A similar axiom was introduced in Herings et al. (2005) in the context of
cycle-free graph games.
We also provide a characterization of the new value using this property.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the model.
In Section 3 we introduce a new value for this class of games. In Section
4 we dene the property of balanced per capita contributions. Moreover we
prove that the new value satises this property. In Section 5 we provide a
characterization of the value. In Section 6 we compare our results with those
presented by Calvo et al. (1996).
2 The model
Let U = f1; 2; :::g be a (may be innite) set of potential players.
A game with transferable utility, TU game, is a pair (N; v), where N  U
is nite and v : 2N ! R satises v(;) = 0: We denote by TU(N) the set of
TU games with N as player set. If S  N; we denote by (S; v) the restriction
of v to the player set S:
Given N  U nite, we call coalition structure on N a partition of the
player set N , i.e. C = fC1; C2; ::::; Cmg  2N is a coalition structure if it
satises
S
Cq2C Cq = N and Cq \Cr = ; when q 6= r: We also assume Cq 6= ;
for all q: Given S  N; we denote by CS the coalition structure restricted to
S; i:e: CS = fCq \ S : Cq 2 C; Cq \ S 6= ;g:
A levels structure for N is a sequence C = (C0; C1; :::; Ch); h  1 with Cl
(0  l  h) coalition structure on N such that:
1. C0 = ff1g; f2g; ::::; fngg:
2. Ch = fNg:
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3. If C lq 2 Cl with 0 < l  h then C lq =
S
S2Q
S for some Q  Cl 1:
We call Cl the l-th level of C:We say that C is a levels structure of degree
h: Hence, the levels structure C has h+ 1 levels.
If h = 1, we say that C is a trivial levels structure.
Given Cl 2 C; we dene C=Cl as the levels structure induced from C by
considering the coalitions in Cl as players.
Let LTU be the set of all (N; v;C) with (N; v) 2 TU(N) and C levels
structure for N: When the levels structure is clear, we may write (N; v) or v
instead of (N; v;C):
Denote Cl = fC l1; ::::; C lm(l)g and let N l = f1; :::;m(l)g. The quotient
game (N l; v=Cl;C=Cl) is the game in LTU dened on the coalition structure
Cl with characteristic function
(v=Cl)(Q) = v
 [
q2Q
C lq
!
for all Q  N l:
A value in LTU is a function f that assigns to each (N; v;C) 2 LTU a
vector f(N; v;C) 2 RN : As usual, fi(N; v;C) represents the payo¤ received
by player i 2 N:
For any (N; v;C) 2 LTU; a value f is e¢ cient ifX
i2N
fi(N; v;C) =v(N):
One of the most important values in TU games is the Shapley value
(Shapley (1953b)). We denote the Shapley value of the TU game (N; v)
as Sh(v) 2 RN :
A nonsymmetric generalization of the Shapley value is the weighted Shap-
ley value (Shapley (1953a), Kalai and Samet (1987, 1988)). Given a vector
of weights ! 2 RN++; we denote the weighted Shapley value as Sh!(v) 2 RN .
3 A new value
Winter (1989) dened the levels structure value (LSV), that is an extension
of the Owen value for this kind of games.
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One of the properties that satises the LSV is coalitional symmetry (Win-
ter, 1989, page 229). This property ensures that if two coalitions are symmet-
ric in the quotient game and furthermore they belong to the same coalition
in the next level, their members should receive the same aggregate amount.
There are several authors in the literature that claim that when the coalitions
represent groups of di¤erent size, this symmetry may not be a reasonable re-
quirement. See, for instance, Levy and McLean (1989) or Kalai and Samet
(1987). In particular, the latter claimed that in this case, it seems reasonable
to assign a size-depending weight to each coalition.
The value  presented by Vidal-Puga (2006) for TU games with coalition
structure takes this idea into account.
Now we extend the value  for games with levels structure. The intuitive
idea of this value is as follows: In a rst stage, we distribute v(N) among
the coalitions of the (h   1)-th level through the weighted Shapley value
with weights given by the size of the coalitions. Then, for any Ch 1q 2 Ch 1;
we distribute the payment received by Ch 1q in the rst stage among all the
coalitions in Ch 2 that belong to Ch 1q : Again we do it through the weighted
Shapley value. At the last stage, we distribute the payment received by the
coalitions in C1 among the agents.
The formal denition is as follows:
Dene the TU game
 
N; vNhN

as (N; v): Assume we have dened the TU
game (Ckp ; v
Nk
Ckp
) for k > l and p 2 Nk and moreover,
X
p2Nk
vNk
Ckp
(Ckp ) = v(N).
Given q 2 N l; we dene a new TU game (C lq; vNlClq ): Take C l+1s such that
C lq  C l+1s . Let T  C lq: We will dene vNlClq (T ): Let  2 RN
l
++ be dened as
q = jT j and r =
C lr for r 6= q: We dene:
vNlClq (T ) = Sh

q

v
N(l+1)
Cl+1s
=Cl
(Cl+1s nClq)[T

for all T  C lq.
It follows from this denition and the induction hypothesis thatX
p2N l
vNlClp(C
l
p) = v(N):
Then, we dene:
i(N; v;C) = v
N0
fig (fig)
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for all i 2 N:
If h = 1; both LSV and  coincide with Sh: For h = 2; the LSV coincides
with the Owen value and  coincides with .
4 Balanced per capita contributions
Myerson (1980) dened the following properties:
Denition 1 A value f satises Balanced Individual Contributions1 (BIC)
if and only if
fi(N; v)  fi(Nnfjg; v) = fj(N; v)  fj(Nnfig; v)
for all i; j 2 N and all (N; v) 2 TU .
Denition 2 Let (N; v) be a TU game. Let  2 RN++. A value f satises
-Balanced Individual Contributions2 (-BIC) if and only if
fi(N; v)  fi(Nnfjg; v)
i
=
fj(N; v)  fj(Nnfig; v)
j
for all i; j 2 N:
Myerson (1980, Lemma 6) proved that, given  2 RN++; there exists a
unique e¢ cient value satisfying -balanced individual contributions.
Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) showed that this family of values coincides
with the family of weighted Shapley values. See also Sánchez (1997) and
Calvo and Santos (2000).
Proposition 3 (Hart and Mas-Colell, 1989, page 604): For any  2 RN++;
Sh is the only e¢ cient value that satises -BIC.
Calvo et al. (1996) extended BIC to the context of games with levels
structure as follows:
1Myerson called it Balanced Contributions.
2Myerson used the equivalent notation -Balanced Contributions with  = 1 ; where 
1


i
= 1i :
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Denition 4 A value f satises Balanced Group Contributions3 (BGC) if
for all C lq; C
l
r 2 Cl such that C lq; C lr  C l+1k 2 Cl+1 (l = 0; 1; :::; h   1); we
have X
i2Clq
fi(N; v) 
X
i2Clq
fi(NnC lr; v) =
X
i2Clr
fi(N; v) 
X
i2Clr
fi(NnC lq; v)
for all (N; v;C) 2 LTU:
This property states that for any two coalitions, C lq and C
l
r that belong
to the same coalitions at higher levels, the contributions of C lq to the total
payo¤ of the members in C lr must be equal to the contribution of C
l
r to the
total payo¤ of the members in C lq:
Calvo et al. (1996) characterized the levels structure value with the prop-
erty of BGC.
The equivalent of -BIC for the context of the TU games with levels
structure, with q =
C lq for all C lq 2 Cl and all l = 0; 1; :::; h   1; is the
following:
Denition 5 A value f satises Balanced Per Capita Contributions (BPCC)
if for all C lq; C
l
r 2 Cl such that C lq; C lr  C l+1k 2 Cl+1 (l = 0; 1; :::; h   1); we
haveP
i2Clq fi(N; v) 
P
i2Clq fi(NnC lr; v)C lq =
P
i2Clr fi(N; v) 
P
i2Clr fi(NnC lq; v)
jC lrj
for all (N; v;C) 2 LTU .
This property ensures that for any two coalitions C lq and C
l
r that belong
to the same coalitions at higher levels, the change per capita in the payo¤s
of the players in C lq if C
l
r leaves the game should be equal to the change per
capita in the payo¤s of the players in C lr if C
l
q leaves the game.
Proposition 6  is e¢ cient and satises BPCC:
Proof. It is straightforward to check that  is e¢ cient.
Now we prove that  satises BPCC: Fix (N; v;C) with C = fC0; ::::; Chg:
Given C l+1k 2 Cl+1; let C lq; C lr 2 Cl such that C lq; C lr  C l+1k :
3Calvo et al. called it Balanced Contributions.
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By denition of ; we have thatX
i2Clq
i(N; v) = Sh

q

v
N(l+1)
Cl+1k
=Cl
Cl+1k

and X
i2Clq
i(NnC lr; v) = Shq

v
(NnClr)(l+1)
Cl+1k nClr
=Cl
Cl+1k nClr

:
Hence, X
i2Clq
i(N; v) 
X
i2Clq
i(NnC lr; v)
= Shq

v
N(l+1)
Cl+1k
=Cl
Cl+1k

  Shq

v
(NnClr)(l+1)
Cl+1k nClr
=Cl
Cl+1k nClr

:
By denition, vN(l+1)
Cl+1k
(T ) = v
(NnClr)(l+1)
Cl+1k nClr
(T ) for all T  C l+1k nC lr; hence we
have that vN(l+1)
Cl+1k
=Cl
Cl+1k nClr
= v
(NnClr)(l+1)
Cl+1k nClr
=Cl
Cl+1k nClr
; and so expression above
can be restated as:X
i2Clq
i(N; v) 
X
i2Clq
i(NnC lr; v)
= Shq

v
N(l+1)
Cl+1k
=Cl
Cl+1k

  Shq

v
N(l+1)
Cl+1k
=Cl
Cl+1k nClr

:
Analogously,
X
i2Clr
i(N; v) 
X
i2Clr
i(NnC lq; v)
= Shr

v
N(l+1)
Cl+1k
=Cl
Cl+1k

  Shr

v
N(l+1)
Cl+1k
=Cl
Cl+1k nClq

:
Since Sh satises -BIC (Proposition 3),
Shq

v
N(l+1)
Cl+1k
=Cl
Cl+1k

  Shq

v
N(l+1)
Cl+1k
=Cl
Cl+1k nClr

q
=
Shr

v
N(l+1)
Cl+1k
=Cl
Cl+1k

  Shr

v
N(l+1)
Cl+1k
=Cl
Cl+1k nClq

r
:
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Moreover, by denition of ; q =
C lq and r = C lr ; thus we obtain the
result.
5 Characterization
In this Section we provide a characterization of the value  using the property
of Balanced Per Capita Contributions introduced in the previous section.
Theorem 7 An e¢ cient value f over the set of games with level structure
satises BPCC if and only if f = :
Proof. Let (N; v;C) 2 LTU and suppose there exist two e¢ cient values f 1
and f 2 satisfying BPCC. We will prove that f 1
Clq
(N; v) = f 2
Clq
(N; v) for all
l 2 f0; :::; hg and C lq 2 Cl; where fxClq (N; v) :=
P
i2Clq f
x
i (N; v), x = 1; 2.
This is enough to prove the result because the C lq are singletons for l = 0.
Note that by e¢ ciency,X
Clq2Cl
fxClq(N; v) = v(N)
for x = 1; 2:
We will prove the result by induction on the level. Consider level h;
Ch = fNg: Since f 1 and f 2 are e¢ cient, we have that f 1N(v) = f 2N(v) = v(N):
Let us assume that the result holds for level k; k  l; i:e:
f 1Ckq (v) = f
2
Ckq
(v)
for all Ckq 2 Ck with l  k  h:
Let C lq 2 Cl: Denote Ql 1 := fC l 1r 2 Cl 1 : C l 1r  C lqg:
We use an induction argument on the cardinal of Ql 1:
Assume that
Ql 1 = 1; say Ql 1 = fC l 1q g: Hence, Ql 1 = fC lqg and by
induction hypothesis:
f 1
Cl 1q
(v) = f 1Clq(v) = f
2
Clq
(v) = f 2
Cl 1q
(v):
Assume that the result holds for
Ql 1 = m   1: Now we prove that it
holds for
Ql 1 = m:
Suppose that
Ql 1 = m; sayQl 1 = fC l 11 ; :::; C l 1m g: LetM = f1; :::;mg:
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Let C l 1r ; C
l 1
s 2 Ql 1: By BPCC,
f 1
Cl 1r
(N; v)  f 1
Cl 1r
(NnC l 1s ; v)
jC l 1r j
=
f 1
Cl 1s
(N; v)  f 1
Cl 1s
(NnC l 1r ; v)
jC l 1s j
(1)
and
f 2
Cl 1r
(N; v)  f 2
Cl 1r
(NnC l 1s ; v)
jC l 1r j
=
f 2
Cl 1s
(N; v)  f 2
Cl 1s
(NnC l 1r ; v)
jC l 1s j
: (2)
Moreover, by induction hypothesis on
Ql 1 we have that f 1
Cl 1r
(NnC l 1s ; v) =
f 2
Cl 1r
(NnC l 1s ; v) and f 1Cl 1s (NnC
l 1
r ; v) = f
2
Cl 1s
(NnC l 1r ; v):
Taking into account these expressions and operating with (1) and (2), we
have that
f 1
Cl 1r
(N; v)  f 2
Cl 1r
(N; v)
jC l 1r j
=
f 1
Cl 1s
(N; v)  f 2
Cl 1s
(N; v)
jC l 1s j
and so,
f 1
Cl 1r
(N; v)  f 2
Cl 1r
(N; v) =
C l 1r 
jC l 1s j
h
f 1
Cl 1s
(N; v)  f 2
Cl 1s
(N; v)
i
: (3)
Applying the induction hypothesis on levels, we have that f 1
Clq
(N; v) =
f 2
Clq
(N; v): That is,X
Cl 1p 2Ql 1
f 1
Cl 1p
(N; v) =
X
Cl 1p 2Ql 1
f 2
Cl 1p
(N; v):
Therefore,
0 =
X
Cl 1p 2Ql 1
f 1
Cl 1p
(N; v) 
X
Cl 1p 2Ql 1
f 2
Cl 1p
(N; v) (4)
= f 1
Cl 11
(N; v) + ::::+ f 1
Cl 1m
(N; v)  f 2
Cl 11
(N; v)  ::::  f 2
Cl 1m
(N; v)
=

f 1
Cl 11
(N; v)  f 2
Cl 11
(N; v)

+ ::::+

f 1
Cl 1m
(N; v)  f 2
Cl 1m
(N; v)

:
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Taking s = 1 in equation (3), we deduce that
f 1
Cl 1r
(N; v)  f 2
Cl 1r
(N; v) =
C l 1r C l 11 
h
f 1
Cl 11
(N; v)  f 2
Cl 11
(N; v)
i
(5)
for all C l 1r 2 Ql 1nC l 11 :
Replacing these expressions in (4),
0 =

f 1
Cl 11
(N; v)  f 2
Cl 11
(N; v)

+
C l 12 C l 11 
h
f 1
Cl 11
(N; v)  f 2
Cl 11
(N; v)
i
+:::::::+
C l 1m C l 11 
h
f 1
Cl 11
(N; v)  f 2
Cl 11
(N; v)
i
=

f 1
Cl 11
(N; v)  f 2
Cl 11
(N; v)
 C l 11 + C l 12 + ::::+ C l 1m C l 11  :
But by denition,C l 11 + C l 12 + ::::+ C l 1m C l 11  > 0;
therefore, f 1
Cl 11
(N; v)  f 2
Cl 11
(N; v) = 0 and so,
f 1
Cl 11
(N; v) = f 2
Cl 11
(N; v):
Replacing this expression in (5) we conclude that
f 1
Cl 1r
(N; v) = f 2
Cl 1r
(N; v)
for all C l 1r 2 Ql 1:
Using the same induction argument for any level t with 0  t  l   1 we
obtain that f 1 = f 2:
6 Concluding remarks
As opposed to Calvo et al. (1996), who characterized the LSV using the
property of Balanced Group Contributions, we provide a characterization of
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a new value using its per capita version. The advantage of these charac-
terizations is that they do not use properties of additivity nor consistency.
Hence, the characterization results still hold for many relevant subfamilies
of TU games, such as the family of simple games, totally balanced games,
or games with a single coalition structure. In this latter case, the property
of balanced per capita contributions reduces to two conditions: one of them
is the property of Balanced Individual Contributions for the members of the
same Coalition (BICC); formally
fi (N; v)  fi (Nn fjg ; v) = fj (N; v)  fj (Nn fig ; v)
for all i; j that belong to the same coalition Cq. Following Calvo et al. (1996),
the Owen value is the only e¢ cient value that satises this property and
Balanced Individual Contributions in the game between coalitions, formallyX
i2Cq
fi (N; v) 
X
i2Cq
fi (NnCr; v) =
X
i2Cr
fi (N; v) 
X
i2Cr
fi (NnCq; v)
for all distinct coalitions Cq; Cr.
As opposed,  is the only e¢ cient value satisfying BICC and balanced
per capita contributions among coalitions, formallyP
i2Cq fi (N; v) 
P
i2Cq fi (NnCr; v)
jCqj =
P
i2Cr fi (N; v) 
P
i2Cr fi (NnCq; v)
jCrj
for all distinct coalitions Cq; Cr.
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